De-alerting is a generic term for deactivating nuclear weapons. It is one way to address urgent needs to reduce nuclear dangers in the immediate and short term. Specific techniques range from pinning open switches of missile motors to removing warheads from delivery systems, storing them and putting them under international monitoring.

　The elimination of first strike threats and of large scale nuclear by accidents or miscalculation are some of the most urgent priorities foe de-alerting. However, de-alerting should be carried out in such a way as to represent  the clearest and most significant progress towards complete nuclear disarmament. In other words, partial de-alerting measures cannot be seen as in themselves, any more than dismantling some nuclear weapons can be a substitute for complete nuclear  disarmament.

　However, de-alerting all nuclear weapons will eliminate the risk of large scale accidental nuclear war, and greatly lower the risk of war by miscalculation. Therefore, de-alerting can allow for a nuclear weapon stand down that will allow the political room and the time to achieve complete nuclear disarmament in a safe and verifiable way.

　The United States – the only nation to have used nuclear weapons in combat – maintains a vast nuclear arsenal including around 2200 operational warheads and an additional 2500 warheads that can be activated if necessary.
The goal of any arms treaty would seem simple enough reduce the number of weapons . But the dirty little secret about nuclear weapons is that the  fewer of  them you have , the more it becomes difficult to get rid of them.

　Striking the right tone for the negotiations is yet another challenge. Andreasen says that "both sides will want to avoid the Cold War dynamic of large, permanent delegations gathering in Geneva and facing off across a large table, pencils sharpened." But, he says, they must also acknowledge that "they have legitimate concerns regarding the size, posture and security of the other side's nuclear arsenals." The most likely sticking point will be agreeing on how to count nuclear weapons: specifically, whether to count all the weapons each country could potentially use or only the ones that are ready at the time of negotiations.

　Either nuclear no-first-use or the second-best alternative will face opposition from advocates of traditionalism in nuclear strategy, which prizes flexibility over all other considerations. But neither idea would face insurmountable obstacles. Certainly, if the role of nuclear weapons cannot be constrained by issuing an authoritative policy statement, then seemingly very little can be achieved in this area at all.

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