Introduction
This paper aims to address the motivational problem that is at the heart of global justice issues. I shall begin with a recognition of the fact that there are presently billions of lives suffering from challenges to health and well-being. I shall argue that people‘s detached responses and indifference towards the suffering of others result from a motivational vacuum that exists within considerations of global justice issues. Therefore, I will examine three possible motivations for action on issues of justice: human rights discourse, causal responsibilities, and compassion. First, I shall argue that human rights discourse, even though it has powerful rhetorical influences in international politics, faces a challenge from cultural relativism and suspicion of its claims to universality. Secondly, I shall consider the causal responsibilities analysis offered by Thomas Pogge. Although the causal responsibilities analysis persuasively assigns moral responsibilities to people in the affluent countries, I shall argue, it still leaves two challenges unaddressed: one concerning human suffering that cannot be blamed on other humans, such as those that result from natural disasters and genetic disabilities. A second problem is that Pogge‘s view seems to deny people of less affluent countries any agency in the pursuit of global social justice. Thirdly, I shall consider the human emotion of compassion. I argue that an emotional motivation, as a supplement to the other two motivations, delivers deeper and more broadly shared concerns for various human sufferings and a more promising platform for action. I shall end with some concluding remarks. 2
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