死刑違憲
寡言的大法官是死刑的最佳代言人
羅馬尼亞旅法哲人蕭沆（Emil Cioran,1911-1995） 在其第一部法文作品《解體概要》寫到死亡變奏：「正是因為它不依靠任何東西，因為它連一句辯辭的影子都沒有，我們才得以在生命中繼續下去。死亡太過精確；一切道理都在它那一邊」（中譯本，宋剛譯）。
死刑是死亡的僕人之一，似乎也受惠籠罩在其主人無上權威的保護下，不可撼搖。君不見死刑制度在我國宛如是不證自明的真理：「一切道理都在它那一邊」，毋庸贅言。反觀廢除死刑制度的支持者，人小聲不小，不斷對著死刑叼唸吵嚷，趕著向死亡搶道理，但這株巨木仍然不動如山。
自認為道理站在他那一邊的人，通常懶得說理，甚至不屑說理。這種「道理的優勢」好比選戰中劣勢的一方總是不斷的朝居高的對手吆喝嗆聲，下戰帖、擺擂台，苦等對手出馬應戰，但彼一方也總是老神在在，何必與下駟對，助長其勢？長久以來我們的社會面對廢除死刑的態度，不正是像選戰一樣，以支持人數的多寡來為道理選邊？沈默的多數人民是支持死刑制度的，道理是站在沈默多數這一邊的，面對少數廢死意見的巨大聲浪，仍然可以充耳不聞，幾乎「連一句辯辭的影子都沒有」。
從這個角度仰望大法官才發現，原來擁護死刑制度的大法官之所以惜墨如金，三言兩語就打發掉一件件的死刑違憲聲請案，正是死刑最佳代言人的應有表現。打從1985年釋字第一九四號解釋販賣毒品處以死刑的規定合憲，就「言簡意賅」地將死刑的合憲性定調為：「以維護國家安全及社會秩序之必要而制定，與憲法第23條並無牴觸」；接著1990年釋字第二六三號解釋認為懲治盜匪條例（現已廢止）對意圖勒贖而擄人者，不分犯罪情況及結果如何，概以死刑為法定刑，立法甚嚴，但因有相關減輕其刑的規定「足以避免過嚴之刑罰，與憲法尚無牴觸」；最近的一號解釋再就毒品危害防制條例關於販毒死刑的規定於1999年作成合憲解釋，認為該條例中「關於死刑、無期徒刑之法定刑規定，係本於特別法嚴禁毒害之目的而為之處罰，乃維護國家安全、社會秩序及增進公共利益所必要，無違憲法第23條之規定，與憲法第15條亦無牴觸」。可以說自1985年釋字第一九四號以來，死刑不違憲的理由高度一致地歸束在「維護國家安全、社會秩序及增進公共利益」的冠冕大旗下，為了這些光明正大的目的，凡重罪當然可以重判死刑，到了1999年的釋字第四七六號解釋大法官們甚至顯露出對死刑違憲聲請案的不耐煩，不客氣地多指點兩句：「惟國家刑罰權之實現......倘與憲法第23條所要求之目的正當性、手段必要性、限制妥當性符合，即無乖於比例原則，要不得以其關乎人民生命、身體自由，遂執兩不相侔之普通刑法規定事項，而謂其有違於前開憲法意旨」云云，釋字第四七六號猶如敲起廢死的喪鐘，一音定錘，而且事不過三，自此以後又攸攸近十載，死刑釋憲案已然成為大法官的拒絕往來戶，該說的都說了，懶得理你（鍾德樹釋憲聲請案遭不受理駁回即是一例）。
不能說的秘密-民意至上！
為什麼死刑制度不違憲？為什麼死刑制度值得維持？釋字第四七六號逼得死刑最佳代言人說出了一段不能說的秘密：「......國家刑罰權之實現，立法機關本於一定目的......倘該目的就歷史淵源、文化背景、社會現況予以觀察，尚無違於國民之期待，且與國民法的感情亦相契合，自難謂其非屬正當......」。這段話可以套入死刑的立法目的是合憲的結論：因為我國有長久的死刑「歷史淵源」，也有「治亂世、用重典」的死刑制度「文化背景」，加以大部分的人民仍然支持死刑制度的「社會現況」事實，現在維持死刑制度仍然是「無違於國民期待」，「且與國民法的感情亦相契合」，豈能說死刑是違憲的呢？如果除卻前段諸如「歷史淵源」、「文化背景」這些空泛的帽子前提，大法官們對支持死刑的真正理由只有一個，就是「社會現況」。
這個「社會現況」是大多數的人民是支持死刑的，因此將死刑制度宣告為違憲是「違背國民的期待」，也「不符合國民法的感情」，大法官們似乎要透過這段話告訴支持廢除死刑的人：不要再來找我了，問題不在我大法官的意見如何，問題在於社會上大部分的人還是不支持廢除死刑的事實上，等到有一天大部分的人改為支持廢除死刑，我會從善如流，宣告死刑違憲的。如果以「民意」來決定法律是否違憲，那有尼爾森（民意調查公司）就夠了，何必勞煩大法官？這真是一號「媚俗」的解釋，令人再次見識到死刑的威力，道理總站在它那一邊，因為它那一邊的人比較多。
限制≠剝奪
其實，釋字第四七六號解釋案的釋憲聲請人已提出一個值得發人深省的角度-憲法第15條生存權的保障與第23條立法限制人民基本權利的分際何在？國家既然有保障人民生命的義務（第15條），那麼國家可以立法處死人民嗎（第23條）？釋字第四七六號解釋低調處理這個深刻的提問，錯失了論述基本權衝突的良機，直接宣示只要「無乖於比例原則」，「要不得僅以其關乎人民生命......而謂其係有違於前開憲法意旨」，因此死刑制度既「無違於憲法第23條，與憲法第15條亦無牴觸」。
憲法第23條本文規定：「以上各條列舉之自由權利，......，不得以法律限制之」，立憲者是刻意地以「例外性語句構造」來強化基本權利的保障，彰顯人民的自由權利「不得立法侵犯」（made no law）的原則。憲法故意不規定成：「以上各條列舉之自由權利，......，得以法律限制之」，正是在告誡以後的立法者注意，基本上立法者是無權立法限制人民的自由權利，除非有特別的情況而且有其必要時，才例外許可以法律限制人民的自由權利。一個稱職的釋憲者，如果能體會立憲者保障人民基本權利的用心，自應從「例外從嚴」的高標準審查立法者有無逾越紅線，而不是反過來替侵犯人民權利的立法者找台階。
憲法第23條除規定比例原則及法律保留原則外，還有一項「有限性原則」。從文義對應上開原則各有所歸，自條文中段「除......必要者外」之「必要」引申為成比例原則；下段「不得以法律限制之」之「法律」以彰顯「法律保留原則」，而「限制」一語可演繹成「有限性原則」。此「有限性」指的是不可無限地剝奪人民的自由權利，亦即人民的自由權利最多祇能以法律手段限制之，而不能剝奪之。參諸民法第17條規定：「自由不得拋棄」（第一項）、「自由之限制，以不背於公共秩序或善良風俗者為限」（第二項），可知自由可以限制，但不能剝奪。生命是自由與權利之所賴，沒有生命等於自由與權利成空，死刑剝奪生命，也同時剝奪人的自由與權利。從此文義及體系解釋，憲法第15條對生存權的保障與第23條的限制性原則不僅不生衝突，而且是互相呼應的。不單生命受到不可剝奪的憲法保障，身體、自由、財產也受有限性原則的保障。
假設立法者立一個法條，規定違反者除其現有全部財產沒入充公外，終其一生亦不得擁有任何財產，類此徹底剝奪一個人財產權的立法，能通過合憲審查嗎？又假設立法者立一個法條規定違反者，即注射毒液使其成為植物人，雖得免一死，但終生禁閉之，只能呼吸，不得活動自由，類此徹底剝奪一個人的身體健康與人身自由的立法，能通過合憲審查嗎？
舉輕以明重，立法將違法者處以死刑，終局地剝奪其生命，能通過合憲審查嗎？答案竟然是可以，但如果連立法剝奪生命都是合憲的，那麼上述徹底剝奪人民自由、財產的立法，又有何不可呢？如此錯謬的解釋，不僅輕忽條文中「限制不包括剝奪」的本意，而且將根本動搖憲法第23條比例原則「禁止過度」的節制精神。釋字第四七六號死刑合憲解釋一出，使大法官基於憲法第23條比例原則所作出的若干違憲解釋頓失光彩，兩相對照之下，言必稱比例原則的釋字第四七六號解釋反倒成比例原則的負面教材，實在諷刺。
死刑全辯護制度
不相信司法，卻願意接受死刑判決的「不怕死」心態
國人長期以來普遍不信賴司法，其中對裁判品質亦多所詬病，持這種看法的比例與支持死刑的高比例不遑多讓。從統計上分析，有一部分的人支持死刑的強烈程度，可以蓋過其對司法不信任的不安。誇張一點的說有些人毫不畏死，縱使司法可能錯判冤殺，手上這一票還是投給支持死刑，不惜「誓死反對廢死」以明志。合理的推測，支持這種意見的人恐怕都不希望錯判冤殺的事降臨己身；因為可以同樣合理的推測，支持這種意見的人恐怕都是自認奉公守法的好人，大體上不認為錯判冤殺的倒霉事會降臨己身。不過，世事難料，有些時候錯判像打雷，不分好壞人，端賴運氣好壞而已。
讓死刑進入冬眠期
雖然本文對釋字第四七六號極盡冷嘲熱諷之能事，但此號解釋倒是清楚的指出死刑問題不應祇是司法的問題，大法官們不能不食人間煙火，不能不顧百姓輿情。如何先說服社會的多眾接受一個無死刑社會的來臨，是一條跳不開、避不掉的彎道，冀圖截彎取直，使大法官直接宣告死刑違憲，不啻奢想空談。因為社會上廢除死刑與支持死刑的比例懸殊，造成二者無法理性持續對話，雖偶有零星交火，但終究隨新聞事件起伏，瞬間消逝。如果以大法官所意指的「社會現況」、「國民期待」、「國民法感」等而言，死刑的「死期」尚遠，但我們只能坐著等「死」嗎？廢除死刑不能獨沽大法官解釋一味，要設法從教育、文化......等社會基礎面向齊力作為，漸次變化人心，或可水到渠成，採取漸進式的溫和廢死策略才可以避免因「突襲性」的違憲解釋可能造成的社會動盪，這些事不好做，但早晚都得做。
建立死刑全辯護制度
在全面廢除死刑那天到來之前，要逐步推動「減死」，籲求：立法者修法減縮以死刑為法定刑的法條、檢察官起訴案件時不求處死刑、法官不判死刑、法務部長不執行死刑，以達成零死刑的理想，讓死刑漸凍進入「冬眠期」。在死刑制度未全面廢除之前，應該階段性調整死刑案件的訴訟程序，尤其在強化死刑案件的辯護功能上，應力圖建立死刑案件的全辯護制度。死刑案件的全辯護制度是指涉犯法定刑為死刑案件之被告（可能被判決死刑之人）自偵查、審判以迄執行之始末過程均應強制辯護，也就是使未選任辯護人的被告（死刑候選人）都有獲得強制辯護的保障。立法上應於刑事訴訟法第31條第1項增訂偵查中所涉罪名最重法定刑為死刑案件，而未經選任辯護人者，檢察官應聲請法院為被告指定公辯護人或律師為其辯護。
再者，如葉文所指出的刑事訴訟法第388條應予廢止，因為該條規定前述「第31條之規定，於第三審之審判不適用」，也就是第三審排除強制辯護之適用，造成被判決死刑的被告若無力選任辯護人，其上訴第三審，乃至之後的非常上訴、再審等需要高度法律專業知識的程序，都只能獨自面對或權且央託同房的「同學」抄抄寫寫應卯，直如兒戲。死刑辯護莫說無法律專業知識的一般被告無法自為辯護，恐怕也不是任何律師都能勝任，死刑全辯護制度應考慮限於資深的刑事律師（如執業5年以上，經辦刑事案件超過50件以上）得被選任或指定為辯護人，而且最好死刑案件的辯護人本身的理念是反對死刑，如此才能期待辯護人在理念上有足夠的熱情，在實戰上有充分的經驗來捍衛、保障被告的生命權，以免被判死刑。
在死刑全辯護制度建立之前，透過廢除死刑聯盟及法律扶助基金會加入「死囚看守」（death watch）的行列，以及諸如蘇建和三死刑案、徐自強死刑案以及葉文所提到的鍾德樹死刑案等個案義務辯護救援，稍可填補制度上的疏漏。
死刑案件程序特別化的必要
除開前述的死刑全辯護制度有待建立外，現行刑事訴訟法使死刑案件適用通常訴訟程序，並不妥適。為使法院審慎判決死刑案件，基於程序比例原則，死刑案件應適用嚴格的特別程序，例如提高各審級之合議庭人數（如地院調高至5人、高等法院7人、最高法院9人）、死刑判決評議應採全數決而非多數決，高等法院判決死刑案件上訴最高法院應自審自結（例外使最高法院兼事實審避免發回纏訟）......等。
大衛的小石頭
至於判決死刑確定案件的閱卷技術問題，突顯死刑案件的程序保障不足，就像前文所說的：「閱卷這種技術性小問題，面對公權力，就像拿一顆小石頭想讓死刑機器停下來」。面對不動如山的死刑制度，廢除死刑聯盟以及反對死刑制度的支持者，不正也是渺小如大衛面對巨人哥利亞的挑戰一般，小石頭雖不起眼，但如果能巧妙的投嵌在死刑機器的要害上，或許巨人也有崩倒的一天。
The unconstitutionality of capital punishment
Lo Bing-cheng
Attorney at Law, Hong Li Law Office
Director-General, Hsinchu Bar Association
Director, Judicial Reform Foundation
Death's advocates: Taiwan's reticent grand justices
Life, the great unknown, is based on nothing comprehensible, and offers not the shadow of an argument. Death, on the other hand, is clear and certain.
-- From A Short History of Decay, Emil Cioran (1911-1995) (original in French)
The death penalty is one of Death's servants. Its seems to enjoy an unshakable status, guarded by its master's authority. Thus, the validity of the death penalty seems taken for granted in Taiwan - a "clear and certain" truth that requires no explaining. Opponents of capital punishment form a small but vociferous minority. They nag and goad the death penalty establishment, seeking to wrest away Death's mantle of reason, but the colossus remains silent and unmoved.
Those who believe Truth to be on their side are usually slow to reason - or won't condescend to it. The arrogance of Truth is seen in an election where the underdog challenges the incumbent to a debate. He throws down the gauntlet, but waits for a response in vain. Why should a secure incumbent take the risk of battle? Our society's attitude toward abolishing the death penalty resembles this scenario, with Truth presumed to be on the side of the majority. The silent masses support the death penalty regime, so Truth stands with it. Confronted with the cries of the minority, the majority simply plays deaf, rarely offering even "the shadow of an argument."
This perspective may shed some light on the stance of the Council of Grand Justices, which has quietly and consistently sided with the death penalty. The justices have displayed great reticence and, with scant comment, thrown out successive cases challenging the death penalty. This is exactly what one would expect of the death penalty's advocates. When, in 1985, the grand justices first upheld the death penalty for the crime of drug peddling (J.Y. Interpretation No. 194), they tersely set the tone for their subsequent treatment of death penalty challenges. The law in question "was enacted as necessary to maintain national security and social order, and does not conflict with Article 23 of the Constitution," they said.
In 1990, J.Y. Interpretation No. 263, the grand justices held that a provision of the Act for the Control and Punishment of Banditry (now repealed) that imposed the death penalty for kidnapping with the intent to obtain ransom (regardless of the circumstances and outcome of the crime) was severe. They noted, however, that the act also allowed for a reduced sentence, and said this was "sufficient to avoid an excessively severe punishment, and so not in conflict with the Constitution."
In J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 of 1999, their most recent interpretation on the issue, the justices upheld another law that imposed the death penalty for drug peddling (the Drug Prevention and Control Act):
The statutory penalties of a death sentence or life imprisonment ... are sanctions imposed by a special law for the purpose of strictly prohibiting hazardous drug offenses, and are necessary to maintain national security and social order and to advance public welfare. They do not violate Article 23 of the Constitution, nor do they conflict with Article 15 of the Constitution.
It can be said that since J.Y. Interpretation No. 194, the reasons cited by the grand justices for upholding the death penalty have consistently been wrapped in a cloak of maintaining national security and social order and advancing public welfare. For such noble and just purposes, it is supposedly natural that severe crimes justify severe punishment, even the death penalty.
By the time of J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 in 1999, the grand justices had begun to show impatience with petitions challenging the death penalty:
However, in the exercise of the country's power to impose criminal penalties ... the principal of proportionality is not violated as long as the penalty provisions in the law are consistent with legitimate purposes, necessary means, and proper limits as required by Article 23 of the Constitution. Merely arguing that special penalty provisions of special criminal laws for specific matters have a bearing on people's lives and bodies, and citing unrelated provisions of general criminal law, does not permit the conclusion that they violate the aforesaid constitutional intent.
J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 seemed to sound the death knell for abolishing capital punishment. It was the third strike for death penalty opponents, and in the long decade since, the grand justices have shut the door on the issue. They've said what needed to be said and will devote no more breath to the matter. (Note, for example, their dismissal of the two petitions on behalf of Chong De-shu.)
The unspoken secret: Public opinion trumps all
Why is the death penalty not unconstitutional? What merits clinging to capital punishment? In J.Y. Interpretation No. 476, the death penalty's proponents were forced to put into words what had been an open but unspoken secret:
[I]n the exercise of the country's power to impose criminal penalties, when the legislature enacts special criminal penalty provisions for specific purposes ... insofar as those purposes do not contradict the expectations of the country's people, viewed from the perspective of history, cultural background, and the current state of society, and are consistent with the people's faith in the law, such provisions cannot be deemed illegitimate.
This passage suggests the death penalty is constitutional because Taiwan has a long "history" of capital punishment, a "cultural background" that supports it - as reflected in the saying "use severe laws to restore order in troubled times" - and a "current state of society" in which the majority of people support it. Capital punishment does not at present "contradict the expectations of the country's people" and is "consistent with the people's faith in the law," so how can it be unconstitutional? But if we look beyond the premises of "history" and "cultural background," which are just window dressing, the grand justices are actually giving only one reason: the "current state of society."
The "state of society" refers to public support for the death penalty. Declaring it unconstitutional would "contradict the expectations of the country's people" and would not be "consistent with the people's faith in the law." The subtext of what the grand justices are telling opponents of the death penalty is: Stop looking to us - what we think isn't the issue. The issue is that the majority of people don't want to get rid of the death penalty. If the majority changes its stance on day, we'll go with the tide and declare it unconstitutional.
If public opinion were enough to determine the constitutionality of a law, surely a Nielsen opinion poll would do - why do we need grand justices? In Interpretation No. 476, the justices are pandering to the public's basest instincts. And so we are reminded of the formidability of the death penalty: Truth is on its side simply because the majority of people are on its side.
'Restrict' does not mean 'deprive'
In the petition that prompted J.Y. Interpretation No. 476, the petitioner raised an issue that deserves careful reflection: Where is the boundary between the right to life under Article 15 of the Constitution and the government's legislative power to restrict the public's fundamental rights under Article 23 of the Constitution? Given that the country is obligated to respect each person's right to life (Article 15), can it at the same time legislatively impose the death penalty (Article 23)? J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 soft-pedals this question and squanders the chance to discuss conflicts between fundamental rights. Instead, it simply states that "the principal of proportionality is not violated" and that "arguing that special penalty provisions ... have a bearing on people's lives and bodies ... does not permit the conclusion that they violate the aforesaid constitutional intent." So the death penalty provisions "do not violate Article 23 of the Constitution, nor do they conflict with Article 15 of the Constitution."
Article 23 of Taiwan's Constitution begins: "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding articles shall not be restricted by law." The framers deliberately used an exception-clause construction to strengthen the guarantee of fundamental rights and underscore the principle of "make no law" infringing these freedoms and rights. The framers did not write "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding articles may be restricted by law," but chose a construction designed to make clear that lawmakers do not have the authority to restrict the freedoms and rights of the people. Only in exceptional circumstances and out of necessity are they permitted to restrict such freedoms and rights through legislation. When reviewing whether lawmakers have overstepped their authority, a competent interpreter of the Constitution should, recognizing the care that the framers took, adopt the rigorous standard that exception clauses "shall be narrowly construed." The interpreter certainly should not side with legislation that infringes the rights of the people.
Article 23 of the Constitution establishes the principles of proportionality and non-delegation, and it further establishes a "principle of limitations." Each of these has a basis in the literal language of Article 23. The principle of proportionality is invoked in the language "except such as may be necessary." The principle of non-delegation is invoked in the language "shall not be restricted by law except ..." (i.e. insofar as freedoms or rights may be restricted, this must be done by enacted law and may not be delegated). And a principle of limitations is invoked in the use of the word "restricted." That is to say, lawmakers are not empowered to deprive without limit the people of their rights and freedoms. The lawmakers may, at most, use legislative means to restrict the rights and freedoms of the people, but not to take them away. For example, consider the following provisions of Taiwan's Civil Code: "No one shall be permitted to waive his liberty" (Article 17, paragraph 1) and "Liberty may not be restricted in any manner contrary to public order or good morals" (Article 17, paragraph 2). These provisions corroborate the principle that the freedoms of the people may be restricted but not taken away.
Life is the foundation of rights and freedoms - without life, there is no space for these. The death penalty takes away life, and in doing so deprives a person of his or her rights and freedoms. This literal and systematic interpretation demonstrates that the guarantee of the right to life under Article 15 of the Constitution and the principle of limitations under Article 23 not only do not conflict, but are in fact in harmony. The right to life is constitutionally guaranteed and no one may be deprived of it. Likewise, people's bodies, freedom and property also enjoy protection under the principle of limitations.
Suppose the legislature enacted a law by which violators would forfeit all of their property into the state coffers and be barred from owning property for the rest of their lives. Could a law that fully deprives a person of property rights pass a constitutionality review? Further suppose that the legislature enacted a law requiring that violators be injected with a toxin that induces a permanent vegetative state. While spared death, the violator would be confined for life, able to breathe but not to move. Could a law that fully deprives a person of physical health and personal freedom pass a constitutionality review?
Considering these less severe examples, if a law condemns violators to death - the ultimate deprivation, deprivation of life itself - can this pass a constitutionality review? Astonishingly, we are told the answer is "yes." But if legislation that deprives people of life is constitutional, then what stands in the way of laws that take away the freedoms described above? Such an absurd interpretation ignores the fundamental intent of Article 23 of the Constitution - that restriction does not include deprivation - and undermines the prohibition against excess and the spirit of restraint embodied in the proportionality principle of the same article.
The cavalier treatment of the proportionality principle in J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 has taken some of the luster off earlier grand justice rulings that invoked this same principle in declaring laws unconstitutional. By paying lip service to this principle, Interpretation No. 476 is, ironically, a textbook example of precisely how it should not be interpreted.
A full advocacy system for death penalty cases
Is the public brave or naive?
There is a longstanding and widespread lack of confidence in the judiciary among Taiwan's citizens. The quality of court judgments is particularly disparaged. How do we reconcile opinion polls showing that skepticism towards the judiciary is nearly as prevalent as support for the death penalty? Evidently, the conviction of some supporters of the death penalty is so strong that it overrides their distrust in the courts. But do not assume that these "true believers" are willing to lay their lives on the line for the death penalty, or would support capital punishment if they risked being wrongfully convicted by an error-prone court. It is doubtful that they are prepared to embrace martyrdom for their cause. Rather, most of these death penalty proponents consider themselves good, law-abiding citizens. They are complacent in their belief that "it would never happen to me."
But life takes its own course. A wrongful conviction can strike like a bolt from the blue, and for that poor person it's not a matter of being good or bad but of having good or bad luck.
The long road to abolition
For all its shortcomings, Interpretation No. 476 deserves some credit, if only for blatantly revealing that the death penalty is not merely a judicial matter. The grand justices do not live in a vacuum and they cannot ignore public sentiment. There is no shortcut on the hard road toward abolition: The public must first be convinced to accept a society without capital punishment. To hope that the grand justices will spontaneously pave the way to abolition is nothing but a pipe dream.
The wide gulf in the number of opponents versus supporters of the death penalty has made a rational, sustained dialogue between the two camps impossible. Occasional flashes of engagement arise in response to specific cases, then quickly disappear again in the ebb and flow of current events. By the measures of the "state of society," the "expectations of the people" and their "faith in the law" cited by the grand justices, it seems the death penalty's own demise will be a long time coming. So can we only sit and "wait for death?" No. The anti-death penalty movement cannot pin all its hopes on the grand justices. We must work in concert to build support for abolition at the grassroots level through education and through cultural and other spheres. If we can gradually transform people's thinking, when the time is ripe, change will come. A gradual, mild approach toward abolition may prove the best option, avoiding the social backlash that could result if the justices were to strike down the death penalty before the public is prepared. Persuading the public will not be easy, but this is work that sooner or later must be done.
A moratorium in practice
Until it is abolished, we must seek a gradual reduction of the death penalty in the law and in the courts. We must appeal to legislators to cut the number of crimes punishable by death; to prosecutors not to seek the death penalty; to judges not to hand down death sentences; and to the Minister of Justice not to sign execution orders. We can block executions by keeping the death penalty in a state of "hibernation."We should also seek adjustments in litigation procedure. In particular, we should strive to strengthen advocacy in death penalty cases by establishing a full advocacy system. This means making counsel mandatory for anyone accused of a crime punishable by death. Counsel should be required throughout the entire course of the proceedings, from the prosecutors' investigations, to the trial and execution of the sentence. This would mean guaranteeing legal counsel to all defendants and death row inmates who have not retained counsel themselves. The legislature should amend Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure to require that prosecutors investigating any case with a maximum penalty of death ask the court to appoint a public defender or lawyer for the accused if no attorney has been retained.
Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter by Yeh Ting-chun (葉亭君), Article 388 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be repealed. This article stipulates that Article 31 (concerning mandatory appointment of public defenders) "does not apply to trials of third instance." In other words, defense counsel is not mandatory in final appeal trials. When a death penalty case enters this stage or any subsequent procedure demanding specialized legal knowledge, such as extraordinary appeals or retrials, some defendants or convicts who lack the means to retain an attorney are forced to represent themselves. Some even turn to their cellmates to help them scrape together a defense. Such defenses are never more than a blind effort and are futile. Mounting a competent death penalty defense is beyond the ability of many lawyers, let alone a person with little or no knowledge of the law.
In establishing a full advocacy system for death penalty cases, only very experienced criminal attorneys (those who have practiced at least five years and handled at least 50 criminal cases) should be retained as defense counsel or appointed as public defenders. Ideally, the lawyers in death penalty cases should be personally opposed to the death penalty. Only in this way can we expect the defenders to have the zeal and in-the-trenches experience needed to stave off the executioner.Even before a full advocacy system is in place, we can do our best to fight a flawed system by joining the Death Watch campaign coordinated by the TAEDP and the JRF, and by providing pro bono legal aid in individual cases, such as those of the Hsichih Trio, Hsu Tzu-chiang (徐自強), and Chong De-shu.
The need for specialized procedures
In addition to establishing a full advocacy system, there is a need to redress the Code of Criminal Procedure's application of ordinary criminal procedure to death penalty cases. To ensure that courts exercise requisite diligence commensurate to the severity of the penalty, rigorous procedures should be prescribed for death penalty cases. For example, the number of judges who hear the case at each court should be raised (e.g. to five judges at the District Court, seven at the High Court and nine at the Supreme Court). Judgments in death penalty cases should require a unanimous decision rather than a majority. When a High Court judgment is appealed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should be required to try the case itself and hand down a concluding judgment rather than remanding the case to the High Court for retrial. In other words, death penalty cases should be treated as an exception at the Supreme Court, with the judges hearing issues of fact as well as issues of law to avoid cases bouncing
epeatedly between the High and Supreme Courts.
Taking down Goliath
Lawyers in death penalty cases have consistently faced bureaucratic difficulties accessing the case files of their clients. The difficulty of accessing files that are absolutely crucial to preparing a defense underscores the lack of procedural protections in death penalty cases. As Yeh writes: "In the face of authority, such a minor technicality was like trying to stop the giant machine with a single, small stone."
In the face of an entrenched and formidable death penalty system, the TAEDP and other opponents of the death penalty are like David squaring off against the massive Goliath. The stones at their disposal may be small, but if hurled skillfully at critical spots in the machinery of death, they may yet bring Goliath down.
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